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Summary. This paper deals with plutonium and key factors
related to impact assessment. It is based on recent work
performed by CEA which summarize the main features of
plutonium behaviour from sources inside installations to the
environment and man, and to report current knowledge on the
different parameters used in models for environmental and ra-
diological impact assessment. These key factors are illustrated
through a case study based on an accidental atmospheric
release of Pu in a nuclear facility.
1. Introduction
Plutonium is a raw material of the nuclear industry and ex-
ists in a large variety of compounds.
The objective of present work is to illustrate through
a case study, the important factors influencing the results of
a radiological impact assessment study. This work is based
on a recent report performed by CEA [1] which intends to
present, discuss and summarize the main features of plu-
tonium behaviour from sources inside installations to the
environment and man. Transfer and behaviour in man and
effects on health are also presented. The objective of this
report is to gather scientific information useful for decision
makers in case of accident or for regulation purposes.
The case study selected here is based on an accidental
atmospheric release of Pu in a nuclear facility. The key fac-
tors which influence the radiological assessment study is
discussed in the following sections.
2. Case study
A fire in a glove box containing 1 kg of heavy metal is
considered. A basic safety calculation would consider the
emission of 1% of 239Pu, and according to the default option
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selected by ICRP for populations [2], in the form of aerosol
particles of 1µm diameter with moderate solubility (M).
On this basis, keeping in mind the simplification objec-
tive as expressed just before, the exposure at 1 km from the
emission point, for a release of 1 GBq of 239Pu will be of
1 mSv all pathways taken into account [1]. The exposure
pathway is for 95% inhalation, for 4% ingestion of leaf veg-
etables and fruits, and for 1% ingestion of cereals. Exposure
to children is less than that to adults and does not imply
supplementary protection. For the case under interest, the re-
lease of 10 g of 239Pu would be of 2.3×1010 Bq (or 20 GBq
if oxygen mass is taken into account). The exposure at 48 h
would be then above the intervention level of 10 mSv and
would imply a confinment of populations. Protective actions
relative to food consumption and trade restriction would also
be usefull and would concern about the same area.
Nature, isotopic composition and physico-chemical
form
First, it is important to check that the accident deals with
a PuO2 powder and not a MOX powder. Indeed, the 239Pu
activity of ten grams of powder would be relatively smaller
in the case of a fresh MOX powder containing 11.6% plu-
tonium in mass (Table 1), that is 1.4×108 Bq of 239Pu per
gram of powder.
Second, if 239Pu is the major isotope in terms of mass,
it is not the case in terms of activity. In the case of MOX
(Table 1), 238Pu activity is about twenty times higher than
the activity of 239Pu with an equivalent inhalation dose
coefficient. The 241Pu activity (β emitter) is also higher
(5×1010 Bq g−1 of powder) but with an inhalation dose co-
efficient 50 times lower. An important point is the case of
241Am produced by filiation of 241Pu which must be taken
into account.
Hence if we consider Pu isotopy of MOX 11.6%, the sum
of activities of alpha emitters (which have relatively close
dose coefficients) and also 2% of 241Pu activity, the toxic-
ity by inhalation of one gram of this plutonium is 15 times
higher than that of one gram of pure 239Pu. On this point
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Table 1. Isotopic composition of fresh MOX 11.6% in mass, activity and dose.
Isotopic Specific Isotopic Activity of 239Pu Relative
composition activity composition 1 g of Pu equivalence contribution
in mass Bq/g in activity factor in dose in dose
Pu238 3.6% 6.3×1011 5.1% 2.3×1010 1 20–64%
Pu239 50.8% 2.3×109 0.26% 1.2×109 1 1–3%
Pu240 24.9% 8.3×109 0.46% 2.1×109 1 2–6%
Pu241 11.2% 3.8×1012 94% 4.2×1011 0.02 7–24%
Am241 1.1% 1.3×1011 0.33% 1.5×109 0.8 1–3%
Pu242 8.4% 1.5×108 0.0% 1.3×107 1 0–0%
Total 100% 100% 4.5×1011 31–100%
there is a source of underestimation of the impact which
could be important. Generally, the exposure to plutonium is
mainly due to 238 and 241 isotopes and then to 239 isotope.
The contribution of 241Am is more variable as a function of
plutonium age.
The third point concerns the physico-chemical form and
the corresponding solubility (moderate M or slow S). The
ratio between the S form for the dioxide and the M form
taken by default varies between 3 and 5 according to the iso-
topes. An overestimation could then be made which could be
avoided.
Granulometry
The last point concerns the size of released particles. This
aspect is particularly important since it appears at different
levels in the calculation. This parameter could also be re-
lated to the physico-chemical form.
Firstly, the particle size is involved in the resuspension
process. In our example, a fire with destruction of the glove
box could lead to a resuspension of 5×10−3 of the powder
activity (relatively close of the 1% used just above). But the
inhalable fraction would be only about 10% of the resuspen-
sion and would induce an exposure by inhalation at least 10
times lower. It is interesting to note that this phenomena is
even more important for nitrate or fluoride forms for which
an inhalable fraction of 0.1% is recommended notably by
DOE [3].
Granulometry is also concerned in the filtration step. The
filter efficiency is certainly higher for larger particles. The
use of a factor of 10−3 in safety reports is probably the source
of considerable overestimation. We will pursue nevertheless
our example by considering the absence or inefficiency of
filtration system.
We consider generally a particle population with a het-
erogeneous dimension and with a distribution following
a log-normal law. Three main parameters are involved,
namely the density of the particles, the median aerodynamic
diameter in activity and the geometric standard deviation of
the distribution. Fig. 1 presents one example of particle dis-
tribution for a density of 11.4 kg L−1. Important points to
know are on one hand the quantity unit, namely particles
number in mass or activity, on the other hand the kind of
diameter, namely physical diameter (sphere equivalent vol-
ume) or aerodynamic diameter. There is here an important
source of errors.
The aerodynamic diameter varies as the square root of the
density. The density used by ICRP for all industrial com-
Fig. 1. Particles’ distribution vs. diameter.
pounds is 3 kg L−1. The theoretical density of plutonium
oxide being 11.5 kg L−1, there could be an underestimation
of the particle aerodynamic diameter by a factor of 2, which
would then slightly modify the inhalable part. For the distri-
bution presented in Fig. 1, 15% of the particles have a diam-
eter < 10µm. This situation is relatively close to the present
case study.
The particle size also affects the atmospheric concentra-
tion as a function of the distance (or transfer time) due to
particle deposition. Considering day unstable meteorologi-
cal conditions, a release at 20 m of height with a low wind
velocity of 1 m/s, particles having a diameter higher than
100µm will then be deposited in the first 2 km, and the in-
halable aerosols part varies from 15% at origin to 60% at
30 km of distance [1].
Fig. 2 shows the variation of the mean dose coefficient
with the distance taking into account the granulometry evo-
lution for different meteorological conditions, characterized
by the stability conditions (St = stable, Un = unstable) and
the wind velocity. This factor increases with the distance
downwind since small particles become predominant. The
curves shapes can be explained as follow. First, there is
a conjugation of the S physico-chemical form selected and
the important fraction (in activity) of size particle class
(10µm) in the content of inhalable particles. This leads to
a mean dose factor five times lower. The second point is
the importance at short distance of non inhalable particles.
The separation of particles is performed more or less quickly
according to the meteorological conditions. It should be no-
ticed that the dose factor at short distance is 25 times less
than the standard dose per unit intake coefficient (DPUI).
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Fig. 2. Effect of granulometry on dose coefficient as a function of the
distance.
Contamination of vegetal and animal productions
The previous analysis show that the granulometry has a mul-
tiple influence on the main exposure, namely the inhalation.
The exposure is then principally dependant of the activity
fraction released as inhalable form. According to the inhala-
tion pathway, particles with a diameter higher than 10µm
could be neglected. But the importance of captation of big-
ger particles (with a diameter higher than 10 or 100µm) for
the food pathway has to be studied. Indeed, the deposition
velocity on ground (5×10−3 m/s) for inhalable particles is
multiplied by a factor 20 for particles of 70µm, and by
a factor of 200 for particles of 200–300µm (aereodynamic
diameter). Ingestion then becomes the main pathway even
with a dose factor lower that the inhalation dose factor.
Concerning the air-vegetable transfer factors and the bio-
logical decrease of deposit on vegetables [4], it appears that
captation is lower for particles of some hundred µm than for
inhalable particles by a factor of around 3. Captation is neg-
ligeable for higher size particles. Granulometry is not a key
factor for deposit captation by rain water. The losses of fo-
liar deposit of aerosols are relatively rapid during the first
days without insofar as being important. They are limited
to a factor 2 or 3 of reduction after 10 to 15 d and then re-
main stable. Afterward, only the plant growth still reduces
the concentration of edible parts.
The calculation described in [1] with a granulometry of
1µm (and a sedimentation rate of 5×10−3 m/s) shows that
the food trade limit could be overtaken up to a distance of
1 km for a release of around 1 g of 239Pu or also around
3 GBq of 239Pu. In our example the equivalent mass ac-
tivity is 15 times higher. Moreover considering that (i) the
Pu mass released is 5 g, (ii) the mean deposit rate at 1 km
is 5×10−2 m/s and (iii) the vegetable captation is 3 times
less, the trade limit would be exceeded by a factor of 200
which then increases the intervention area up to a distance of
around 10 km.
The other exposure pathways are minor because pluto-
nium is a non-metabolized element. There is no significant
transfer from soil, no transfer between leaves and fruits or
roots, and transfers to animal products (meat and milk) are
relatively low. The resuspension of soil particle has been in
the past considered to be a significant pathway. Analysis of
Chernobyl accident, however, has shown that this is of minor
importance.
The above analyses of the scenario lead to a better un-
derstanding of what could be the reality and the needs of
intervention in case of an accident:
First of all, the toxicity of one gram of plutonium largely
depends on its isotopy. In the retained example, it is
15 times higher to one gram of pure 239Pu.
Secondly, the granulometry of released particles plays
a major role in the relative importance of the different
exposure ways. For a release of fine particles (reference
case since there is a filtration level), inhalation is the
dominant exposure pathway. However, in the absence of
filtration, the release could be higher with particles of
greater sizes. The ingestion pathway may then become
the most important. Under the conditions in our example,
the inhalation exposure would remain less than 10 mSv
in the early phase of the accident, out of the center, and
would not imply confinement measures. But the food
restriction intervention in the later phase, for leaf vegeta-
bles, would concerns an area of 10 km length.
Thirdly, in both cases (with or without filtration), the con-
sequences of an accidental Pu release are limited in time,
the pathways playing a role at long term being secondary.
Finally, results are insensitive to age and intervention
measures should be applied (or not) to the whole popula-
tion. The fetus transfer or through maternal milk transfer
are also relatively low.
Relative aspects to exposure and risks
These points are rarely discussed in impact studies. The
dose coefficients (dose per unit intake) are calculated in
a standard way with a density of 3 kg L−1 and a standard
deviation of 2.5 kg L−1. On these bases, a PuO2 aerosol con-
tains 420 particles per Bq [5]. In reality, the density is near
to 9 kg L−1 and the standard deviation to 1.7 kg L−1. Under
these conditions the particle number would be much lower,
around 30 particles per Bq. Uncertainties on these dose fac-
tors increase linearly with the diminution of particle number.
It is interesting to notice that uncertainties on effective
doses delivered to the population are low. On the contrary,
they are much higher at the individual scale and insofar as
the particle number is small.
Concerning the uncertainties on the risk, the spatial dose
distribution could be very heterogeneous. The studies show
that the presence of hot spots is systematically associated
to the appearance of fibroses sources, which decreases the
delivered doses to cell targets. Hence in the case of insolu-
ble compounds of high specific activity, calculated equiva-
lent doses according to the ICRP recommendations would
be highly overestimated if they are assumed to reflect the
cancer risk.
3. Conclusions
This study performed on the basis of a complete report [1]
confirms information brought by [6] for respirable aerosols
for fresh MOX powders. Nevertheless it shows that, at least
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in some cases, when measured parameters are used, the im-
pact of an accident could be very different from what is
described by standard theoretical assessments. Details on the
nature of plutonium handled in the facility, its isotopy and
granulometry (in case of powders) must be known by the nu-
clear operators to accurately assess the impact. It is worth
noting that because of the safety arrangements related to
criticality risk, the inventories that could be concerned in
a laboratory are necessarily limited.
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